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ABSTRACT 
International Financial Cooperation today may require a more complex preparation than 
ever, particularly in the era of globalization. It is known that the global economy may bring 
about changing socio-economic, cultural, technological, and political condition of many 
countries, whilst the globalization itself has often surpassed domestic circumstances among 
nations which consequently leads to the need of providing a more advance principles of 
international financial cooperation. Regardless to these changing circumstances, the 
international financial cooperation may differ in nature which relatively depends on the 
types and objectives of the international institution involved. On the other sides, the 
literatures on international policy coordination are vast and multifaceted (there is no one 
size fits for all). However, there are some basic conditions that can be shared in common. 
Based on the study of various literatures, it is found that the challenges of international 
financial cooperation today may encircle not only about the readiness of the nation states, 
institutions, and related projects in utilizing the international financial cooperation, but it 
may also include other variuos aspects such as an optimal structure of cooperation 
agreement, a pattern of compliance with cooperation agreements, principles for cross 
border cooperation on crisis management, sharing rules of the costs of future interventions, 
and perhaps specific issues and barriers. All of these challenges and barriers certainly need 
coordinated actions to ensure that the optimal objectives of the international financial 
cooperation are achieved. Thus, these pre-requisite conditions should be embraced in the 
more advance guiding principles of the international financial cooperation. As such, the 
relevant authorities, including supervisory agencies, central banks, and finance ministries 
will also be able to tackle a severe stress in case of sudden financial crisis and managing 
them successfully. 
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BACKGROUND  
INTRODUCTION 
Hale., et al (2013), in his article “Gridlock : The growing breakdown of global 
cooperation” stated that global cooperation today is facing gridlocked across a range 
of issue areas”. Hale., et al, explained further that The reasons for the gridlock are 
not the result of any single underlying causal structure, but rather of several 
underlying dynamics that work together. Global cooperation today is failing not 
simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems but also the multi 
polarity has caused a global problem cannot be adequately addressed. While, the 
institutional inertia has created the conditions under which a multitude of actors 
could benefit from forming multinational companies, investing abroad, developing 
global production chains, and engaging with a plethora of other social and economic 
processes associated with globalization. These conditions, combined with the 
expansionary logic of capitalism and basic technological innovation, changed the 
nature of the world economy, radically increasing dependence on people and 
countries from every corner of the world. This interdependence, in turn, created 
demand for further institutionalization, which states seeking the benefits of 
cooperation provided, beginning the cycle anew. 
Thus, the arrangement of international financial cooperation may no longer 
encircle around the prudent use of the financial itself such as loan funds, financial 
aids and other form of financial cooperation and effective debt management, but it 
should also include an optimal structure of cooperation agreement that optimize 
benefits of the international financial cooperation for each party involved, a pattern 
of compliance with cooperation agreement, principles for cross border cooperation 
on crisis management, sharing rules of the costs of future interventions, and perhaps 
specific issues and barriers which need coordinated action that may arise in 
handling severe stress that may happen during the period of financial cooperation 
beside sharing information where ever necessary and possible, and to ensure that 
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financial cooperation develop adequate contingency plans. In addition, the issue of 
foreign debt and its impact on human rights and development and sound risk 
governance practices must also be taken into consideration. 
It is true that the international financial cooperation may differ in nature, 
depends on the types of the financial institution involved and the objective of the 
cooperation, while the literature on international policy coordination is vast and 
multifaceted (there is no one size fits for all). However, there are some basic 
conditions that can be shared in common. 
Aware to such phenomena, a more advance international financial cooperation 
is a must if countries involved in the cooperation want to achieve optimum benefits, 
otherwise only one country gain benefits at the expense of others. Therefore an 
analysisregardinganoptimalinternational cooperation deems relevant with the 
objective of finding the common basic priciples that can help improve the future 
financial cooperation and provide solution to the growing breakdown of global 
cooperation. This research is based on various literature studies which aimed at 
finding the universalities of the international financial cooperation. 
 
LITERATURE STUDIES 
Domestic Conditionality In International Cooperation 
Svolik. (2004), stated that. An international financial cooperation agreement 
between governments that cannot perfectly observe their domestic circumstances 
reconciles a trade-off between political efficiency of international cooperation 
andincentives to misrepresent domestic circumstances. The possibility that some 
governments would misrepresent their domestic circumstances in order to achieve a 
more favorable cooperation outcome leads to the inability of reaching efficient 
cooperation outcomes in a range of plausible scenarios. Therefore, he suggested that 
there are two central aspects of international cooperation that must be taken into 
consideration: (1) the optimal structure of international cooperation agreements 
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which can perfectly provideoptimum advantages for domestic circumstances, and 
(2) the pattern of compliance with international cooperation agreements which 
determines commitmentlevels,avoidingconsequencesofviolation/risks, and high 
quality of monitoring capability. 
 
The New Feature Of Crisis Today 
Niepmann and Eisenlohr. (2011), observed that the new feature of crises today 
is that they are rarely local and often involve banks and consumers worldwide. Two 
aspects of financial globalization have been driving this features. First, the balance 
sheets offinancial institutions have become increasingly linked internationally. As a 
result, a crisis can spread rapidly from the financial sector of one country to other 
countries – a phenomenon known as ‘contagion’. Second, there has been a steep rise 
in cross-border banking. In a world of global finance, investors from many different 
countries are directly affected when a bank is in distress. This poses new challenges 
for policy-makers responding to financial crises. Their decisions have effects both at 
home and abroad. At the same time, domestic economic outcomes often depend on 
interventions by foreign governments. The recent financial crisis has shown how this 
international dimension to policy interventions can lead to conflicts of interest 
between countries. Thus, if governments do not cooperate when dealing with an 
international crisis but instead behave strategically, this can lead to decisions that 
are ‘sub-optimal’ from a global perspective. Different institutional arrangements that 
allow governments to cooperate within well specified rules could address this 
concern and improve global crisis management. 
 
Beneficial Cooperation Between Government 
Studies by Freixas., et al (2011) have made the case that cooperation between 
governments can be beneficial when financial stability is shared across countries. 
Their analysis shows that without financial stability, there is no guarantee that at 
least one country gains from cooperation while no country loses. This may limit the 
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willingness of countries to stick to the agreement when a crisis actually happens. 
However, they argued that the willingness of policy-makers to agree in advance on 
institutions for crisis management and sharing rules for the costs of future 
interventions is also limited because of concerns related to ‘moral hazard’. 
 
Countries Joint Policy 
Meyer (2002), stated that two countries can both be better off if they take policy 
decisions jointly—with concern for the welfare of both rather than each pursuing its 
own goals independently. Ghosh and Masson (1994) go on to show that the gains 
from coordination accrue when it is the transmission effects of policy, not their 
domestic effects, that are uncertain. 
 
The Importance Of Guiding Principles (Oecd, 2010) 
OECD (2010), mentioned that the guiding principles are necessarily designed 
to assist States and all relevant actors including private and public, national and 
international financial institutions, bilateral lenders and organized groups of 
bondholders in the conduct of their respective activities and pursuit of their 
respective interests relating to external debt. These principles apply to the lending 
and borrowing decisions of States and other actors such as international financial 
institutions and private institutions as appropriate, the negotiation and execution of 
loan agreements or other debt instruments, the utilization of external loan funds, 
debtrepayments, the renegotiation and restructuring of external debt, the provision 
of debt relief when appropriate and to all policies, strategies and activities related 
thereto. The principles recognize the contingent liabilities which can arise for a State 
from external borrowing and lending between private actors. For the purposes of 
these principles, external (or foreign debt) refers to an obligation (including 
monetary obligation) created under a contractual agreement and owed by a State to 
a non-resident lender which may either be an international financial institution, a 
bilateral or multilateral lender, a private financial institution or a bondholder, or is 
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subject to foreign law. It includes: (i) loans, that is, advances of funds to the debtor 
by the lender on the basis of an undertaking that the borrower will repay the funds 
at some future point (including deposits, bonds, debentures, commercial loans and 
buyer’scredits); and (ii) suppliers’ credits, that is, contracts whereby the supplier 
allows the customer to defer payment until some time after the date on which the 
goods are delivered or the services are provided. The aggregate of a State’s 
outstanding external debts is referred to as its external debt stock. These principles 
reflect and are consistent with international human rights standards. They apply 
existing human rights standards as they pertain to problems orissues occasioned by 
the external indebtedness of States and related policies. 
 
Guiding Principles For Cross-Border Cooperation On Crisis Management (Fsb, 
2009) 
Financial Stability Board (2009), recommended the importance of providing the 
principles for Cross-border Cooperation on Crisis Management. Through these 
principles, relevant authorities, including supervisory agencies, central banks, and 
finance ministries, commit to cooperate both in making advance preparations for 
dealing with financial crises and in managing them. The principles also commit 
national authorities from relevant countries to meet regularly alongside core 
supervisory colleges to consider together the specific issues and barriers to 
coordinated action that may arise in handling severe stress at specific firms, to share 
information where necessary and possible, and to ensure that firms develop 
adequate contingency plans. 
In different perspectives, Lumina (2011) in his article “ Guiding principles on 
foreign debt and human rights (United Nations General Assembly), recommended 
that the issue of foreign debt and its impact on human rights and development, 
particularly in developing countries, has preoccupied the international community 
for more than three decades and although a number of official initiatives to address 
it have been implemented over the years, these have failed to deliver an equitable 
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and enduring solution in line with the political commitments reflected in various 
resolutions and declarations, notably the Millennium Declaration and the Monterrey 
Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development. 
Moreover, the debt of these countries has continued to grow and to constrain not 
only their development prospects but also to undermine their capacity to establish 
the conditions for the realization of human rights, particularly economic, social and 
cultural rights. 
Lumina (2011), argued that national development strategy should be country-
owned and should contain development goals that are responsive to the needs of the 
people who are the ultimate beneficiaries of development. Such goals should be 
agreed through a meaningful and participatoryconsultation process involving all 
stakeholders, especially civil society organizations. Besides, he stated that country 
ownership of national development strategiesis the foundation of development 
effectiveness. It implies that national governments should have the ability to freely 
choose the strategies which they design and implement, and take the lead in both 
policy formulation and implementation. 
In order to understand a more detail explanation about the clear requirements 
for States to cooperate with and assist each other in achieving certain goals, 
including ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development, the 
writer cited a number of factors from some clausules of the United Nations Charter 
(2011), that need to be considered as the guding principles when making 
international cooperation among others as follows : (i) mitigating the impact of 
international financial cooperation, (ii) rights and obligations in external debt 
agreements, (iii) minimum core obligations, (iv) responsibilities of international 
cooperation among states, (v) the shared responsibility of debtors and creditors, (vi) 
ensuring an independent process of national development,(vii) transparency, 
participation and accountability, (viii) general legal and institutional framework, (ix) 
decision to borrow or to lend, (x) loan negotiation and contracting, (xi) legal 
authority to contract, (xii) use of loan funds, (xiii) debt servicing orrepayment, (xiv) 
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renegotiation and restructuring, (xv) debt relief, (xvi) debt moratorium, (xvii) 
sharing risks of the loan, (xviii) sale of debt in the secondary market, (xix) debt 
sustainability assesment, (xx) public audits of debt and lending portfolios, (xxi) 
contingent liabilities, and (xxii) allignment to national development goals. 
 
Indonesia Case 
Related to International Financial Cooperation, some Indonesian experienced 
are expounded below which can be used as a lesson learned in order to provide a 
clearer insight for the readers about the discrepancies between the existing 
conditions and the futurechalenges of International Financial Cooperation as 
follows: 
When Indonesia was under the economic crisis during the period of 1997/1998, 
IMF suggested that Indonesia should raise up its interest rates up to 70% by 
reasoning of avoiding capital outflow. It was true that this policyhad been successful 
in pressuring the inflation rate. Hoever, this policy was unable to recover the 
Indonesian economy as a whole. Meanwile, the real sector was geting worst. 
Another unfavourable problemencountered by Indonesia during that economic 
crisis when Indonesia intended to initiate the formation of CBS (Currency Board 
System or Fixed Exchange Rate System), this policy was rejected by the IMF 
(Cirillus, 2004). 
Based on the political and economic point of view, the risky prescription for 
political and economic stability is the execution of fiscal tightening and budget 
reduction. For instances, during the crisis where the people’s purchasing power is 
declining, whilst at the same time IMF demanded Indonesian government to reduce 
the oil and electricity subsidy. According to the pure economic analysis, it can be 
correct, but not from polical economic insight, especially when the time frame of its 
implementation is not persisted. Following, the reduction of oil and electricity, there 
social riots took place in Jakarta in mid 1998. 
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Another crucial policy pursued by the IMF was about its recommendation to 
launch the deregulation and privatization policies on the Indonesian econmomy 
during the crisis. The reasons of IMF were to improve eficiency and competitiveness. 
In fact, these polices have caused the overtaking off the share ownership of 
Indonesian State Entrprises by the foreigners who have higher purchasing power 
compare to Indonesian investors. This phenomenon had worsen the Indonesian 
economy. In that period, the IMF have also recommended to liquidate 16 Indonesian 
Banks, to reduce import tax of sugar and rice, and also to abolish the prohibition of 
wooden logs export. 
 
Further Insight Of Developing Countries Cases 
Country World Bank 
Loan 
Privatisation 
Condition 
IMF 
Loan 
Privatisation 
Condition 
Bangladesh Development 
support 
credit III 
(2005) 
Bring Rupali Bank to 
the point of 
divestment by Dec 
2004; (Prior Action) 
Third 
Review 
under 
the 
PRGF 
(2005) 
Bring Rupali 
(Bangladesh Bank) to 
point of sale 
(Benchmark & Prior 
Action) 
Ethiopia Second 
poverty 
reduction 
support 
credit (2004) 
Continue satisfactory 
implementation of 
CBE (Commercial 
Bank of Ethiopia) 
restructuring plan 
(Benchmark) 
Sixth 
Review 
under 
the 
PRGF 
(2005) 
Finalisation of 
restructuring plan 
for the National 
Bank Ethiopia 
(Benchmark) 
Ethiopia Second 
poverty 
reduction 
support 
credit (2004) 
Offer for sale 
Commercial Bank of 
Ethiopia, including 
preparation of bid 
documents and 
issuing the invitation 
for bids 
(benchmarks) 
Sixth 
Review 
under 
the 
PRGF 
(2005) 
Finalisation the 
adoption of a 
financial 
restructuring plan by 
the goverment for 
the Commercial 
Bank of Ethiopia 
(Performance 
Criteria) 
Ghana Third 
poverty 
reduction 
Electricity: maintain 
implementation of 
tariff adjustment 
Third 
Review 
under 
Ensure electricity 
and water tarrifs are 
in line with their 
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Country World Bank 
Loan 
Privatisation 
Condition 
IMF 
Loan 
Privatisation 
Condition 
support 
credit (2005) 
mechanism 
(Benchmark) 
the 
PRGF 
(2005) 
respective formulas 
for automatic 
quarterly adjusments 
(Privatisation 
Associated Reform 
Performance 
Criteria) 
Mali Public 
Finance 
Management 
Credit (2005) 
Agree on the 
privitation for the 
Inter-Bank of Mali 
(Benchmark) 
Sixth 
Review 
under 
the 
PRGF 
(2005) 
Tender for Sale of 
Goverment Stake in 
Inter-Bank of Mali 
(Benchmark) 
Nicaragua Poverty 
Reduction 
Support 
Credit (2003) 
Sale of 49% of the 
Nicaraguan 
Goverment’s shares 
of ENITEL 
(telecomunications 
company) has been 
initiated; sale of 49% 
of ENITEL’s shares 
concluded 
(Benchmark) 
Fifth & 
Sixth 
Review 
of the 
PRGF 
(2006) 
Divest the remaining 
goverment stake in 
ENITEL 
(telecomunications 
company) 
(Benchmark) 
World Bank and IMF conditionality: a development injustice, Eurodad, June 2006 
24 
 
The above cases showed that the World Bank and IMF who have a lot of 
experiences in managing the modern and well developed economic should actually 
have known the institutional problems, market conditions, law enforcement and 
bureaucracy barriers of the developing countries. Hence, it should have given 
sufficient guidances or advices for its member countries who are expecting its 
assistances. As a matter of fact, the foreign loan which is provided by the World 
Bank is still a big burden for the developing countries up to the recent years as it can 
be seen above. 
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ANALYSIS 
International Financial Cooperation today may require more complex 
preparation than ever, particularly in the era of globalization. It is known that the 
global economy has surpassed domestic circumstances among nations which 
consequently lead to the need of preparing an advance international financial 
cooperation principles in line with the changing socio-economic, cultural and 
political condition of the world. Regardless to these changing circumstances, the 
international financial cooperation may differ in nature, depends on the types of the 
financial institution involved and the objective of the cooperation, while the 
literature on international policy coordination is vast and multifaceted (there is no 
one size fits for all). However, there are some basic conditions that can be shared in 
common. The writer observation based on various literatures found that the 
universalities of the international financial cooperation can be seen as follows : 
There are two central aspects of international financial cooperation that must 
be taken into consideration: (1) the optimalstructure of international financial 
cooperation which can perfectly provideoptimum advantages for domestic 
circumstances, and (2) the pattern of compliance with international cooperation 
agreements which determines commitment levels, avoiding consequences of 
violation/risks, and high quality of monitoring capability. (Svolix, 2014).Studies by 
Freixas., et al (2011), showed that without financial stability, there is no guarantee 
that at least one country gains from cooperation while no country loses. This may 
limit the willingness of countries to stick to the agreement when a crisis actually 
happens. However, they argued that the willingness of policy-makers to agree in 
advance on institutions for crisis management and sharing rules for the costs of 
future interventions is also limited because of concerns related to ‘moral hazard’ 
The failure of major economies and global institutions to recognize and 
address the global governance issues can be seen from the World Bank data (2012) 
which potrayed that the total external debt of emerging and developing economies 
rose from US$2,678.4 billion in 2003 to US$5,414.6 billion in 2010 and is projected to 
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rise to US$6,446.3 billion in 2012.3 Debt service payments rose from US$795.2 billion 
in 2003 to US$1,743.7 billion in 2010, and were projected to rise to US$2,010.8 billion 
and US$2,265.5 billion in 2011 and 2012 respectively. In 2003, the total external debt 
of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) – those countries whose debts are 
deemed “unsustainable” by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 
- was US$172 billion. In 2010, it decreased marginally to US$147.9 billion, ostensibly 
due to international debt relief. However, it was projected to rise to US$163.3 billion 
in 2011 and US$178 billion in 2012 largely as a consequence of new loans taken out 
to mitigate the impacts of the global financial crisis. Additionally, as recent events in 
Europe suggest, debt problems are not the exclusive preserve of developing 
countries.The above facts can be used as a strong conviction for every nation state 
that the international financial cooperation model needs to be reformed. In order not 
to make the same mistakes in the future, the international financial cooperation 
should avoid the overwhelming dominance of developed countries over the 
developing countries in designing their cooperation. Instead, an international 
financial cooperation should emphasize upon the importance of fairness, equality 
and justice which ensure the optimum goals of the financial cooperation among the 
countries involved. In other words, no one country is allowed to dominate the 
others. 
The over ruling of international financial cooperation such as in the case of a 
conditional of debt relief upon the loan provided such as the implementation of 
policies of privatization, trade liberalization, investment deregulation or financial 
sector liberalization related to debt relief, creditors should no longer imposed on the 
debtor countries. Conversely, under the occasion of indebtedness, the creditor 
should respect the debtor’s State’s independent process to freely choose the 
strategies which they design and implement, and take the lead in both policy 
formulation and implementation. In other words, it can be said that a national 
development strategy should be country-owned and should contain development 
goals that are responsive to the needs of the people who are the ultimate 
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beneficiaries of development. Such goals should be agreed through a meaningful 
and participatoryconsultation process involving all stakeholders, especially civil 
society organizations. It is apparent, that Country ownership of national 
development strategiesis the foundation of development effectiveness. It is essential 
to underline that Country ownership of national development strategies is the 
foundation of development effectiveness. It implies that national governments 
should have the ability to freely choose the strategies which they design and 
implement, and take the lead in both policy formulation and 
implementation.Furthermore, any such economic, financial or technical advice, 
instruction, guidance or similar recommendation should be exclusively aimed 
towards restoring a debtor State’s economic viability and growth, and thus its ability 
to repay its external debts without sacrificing its ability to perform its international 
human rights obligations. Other objectives that are remotely or tangentially 
connected with this aim should be avoided. Whenever such policies are deemed 
necessary by a debtor State, adequate social security measures to mitigate the 
adverse impact thereof, especially on vulnerable or marginalized groups, must be 
put in place. 
More importantly, under an international financial cooperation, creditor States 
and the international financial institutions must not take advantage of an economic, 
financial or external debt-related crisis as an opportunity to push for structural 
reforms in debtor States, however useful such reforms might be perceived to be in 
the long term. Such reforms should be initiated, formulated and implemented by the 
debtor States themselves, if they deem appropriate, in pursuance of an independent 
process of national development. It can be said, that international financial 
cooperation must beconsistent with country-designed development strategies. 
It should be noted, that when one country arranged a loan agreement, the 
success of the agreement will be depending on a variety of factors, such as 
responsible lending and borrowing, the loan terms and conditions, prudent use of 
loans and proper debt management, debt financing that cancontribute to countries’ 
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economic development and the establishment of conditions for the realization of 
human rights. Nonetheless, empirical evidence shows that in many of the poorest 
countries the fulfillment of debt service obligations is often undertaken at the 
expense of social investment, including investment in services that contribute to the 
realization of human rights. In addition, excessive debt service burdens and harmful 
conditions linked to loans and debt relief often limit investment in and undermine 
the provision of accessible public services. Apart from undermining obligations on 
economic, social and cultural rights, excessive debt burdens pose major obstacles for 
some countries in achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Therefore, in order 
to avoid an excessive debt burden, the creditors and debtors should share 
responsibility for preventing and resolving unsustainable debt situations, and both 
parties need to ensure that funds will not be used for non-public purposes or for a 
non-viable project.In the case of international financial cooperation is related to 
lending and borrowing, it can be stated that any debtor states experienced difficulty 
in repaying their external debts, the debtor states should have a right to renegotiate 
these to creditors with the aim of reaching a restructuring agreement that enables 
the debtor state to service its external debts without compromising its capacity to 
fulfill its international human rights obligations or implement its development 
goals. The renegotiation and restructuring should be conducted in good faith and 
should cover all types of external debts owed to all types of external creditors, 
including international financial institutions. Then, for the heavily indebted 
countries, the alleviation of debt and debt service burdens should be made possible 
through debt relief efforts such as debt forgiveness, debt rescheduling, debt service 
reduction and interest moratorium. Again, it is important to note that debt relief 
efforts must not compromise the provision of basic services. In particular, debt relief 
conditions that may adversely impact the realization of human rights or undermine 
development in the beneficiary State must be avoided, and financing from debt 
relief mustneither replace official development assistance nor be considered as such. 
By the time, when there is a change in circumstances beyond the control of the 
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Borrower State arises, the parties should negotiate and agree on a moratorium on 
debt repayment. Such a moratorium should apply to the principal, interest, 
commission and penalties and should apply throughout negotiations on debt 
restructuring.Another crucial aspect of international financial cooperation is 
supposed to be about sharing risk of the loan which often caused by the fluctuation 
of exchange rate. As such, lenders should offer the possibility of denominating all or 
part of the loan in the Borrower State’s local currency, or the lenders and borrowers 
should have an advance agreement to avoid exchange rate risks through forward 
contract negotiation (hedging mechanism). Besides, in order to help balance output 
or trade risk, lenders should offer the possibility of indexing loan repayments to 
rates of economic and/or export growth of the debtor’s countries. 
When there is any disputes between parties involved in international financial 
cooperation, the disputes must be resolved by an independent mechanism. In this 
regard, States and all relevant actors including international financial institutions, 
bilateral or multilateral lenders and private financial institutions should consider the 
establishment of an international debt workout mechanism to restructure 
unsustainable debts and resolve debt disputes in a fair, transparent, efficient and 
timely manner. The main aim of such a mechanism is to ensure that debtor States 
can achieve economic viability and growth, and restore their capacity to service their 
external debts without compromising the fulfillment of their international human 
rights obligations. The establishment and operation of such a mechanism should be 
guided by the foundational principles s as well as the following specific 
considerations: (a) The international debt restructuring mechanism should be 
independent of creditors and debtors; (b) The assessment of the debtor State’s 
economic or financial situation shouldbe made by a neutral body; (c) The 
mechanism should ensure that a debtor State, during and after the restructuring 
process should be able to fulfil its international human rights obligations, implement 
its development programme and provide basic services to all persons living in its 
territory and under its jurisdiction; (d) The mechanism should have the mandate to 
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rule on the alleged “odiousness” or “illegitimacy” of particular external 
debts.Finally, it is understood that international financial cooperation is always 
related to the project financing as it has been illustrated in the Indonesian case study 
above. In order to ensure the effectiveness of the cooperation in project financing, it 
is necessary to ensure that the international treaty which binding the project 
financing shall cover, among others, the following areas : (1) implementation of 
project strategies and policies and development/elaboration of forecasts, scenarios, 
as well as improvement of the statistical recording system in theproject based on 
timely exchange of information in accordance with international practices, as well as 
infrastructure developments, (2) establishing effective mechanisms to address 
potential crisis situations in a spirit of solidarity, (3) modernization and 
enhancement of existing project infrastructures of common interests, including 
project capacities, safety and security. (4) The regulatory cooperation shall take into 
account the need to ensure relevant public service obligations, including measures 
to inform and protect customers from unfair selling practices, and the project should 
provide wide access for the benefit of the public. 
 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
Conclusion 
International financial cooperation may differ in nature, depends on the types 
of the financial institution involved and the objective of the cooperation (there is no 
one size fits for all). However, there are some basic conditions that can be shared in 
common. Based on the study of various literatures, it is found that the challenges of 
international financial cooperation today may encircle not only about the readiness 
of the nation states, institutions, and projects in utilizing the financial cooperation, 
but it may also include an optimal structure of cooperation agreement which can 
perfectly provide optimum advantages for domestic circumstances. 
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To achieve such objectives, the international financial cooperation model needs 
to be reformed. In order not to make the same mistakes in the future, the 
international financial cooperation should avoid the overwhelming dominance of 
developed countries over the developing countries in designing their cooperation. 
Instead, an international financial cooperation should emphasize upon the 
importance of fairness, equality and justice which ensure the optimum goals of the 
financial cooperation among the countries involved. The over ruling of international 
financial cooperation such as in the case of a conditional of debt relief upon the loan 
provided such as the implementationof policies of privatization, trade liberalization, 
investment deregulation or financial sector liberalization related to debt relief 
Creditors should no longer imposed on the debtor countries. 
When the international financial cooperation is related to lending and 
borrowing agreement, it should be noted that any such economic, financial or 
technical advice, instruction, guidance or similar recommendation should be 
exclusively aimed towards restoring a debtor State’s economic viability and growth, 
and thus its ability to repay its external debts without sacrificing its ability to 
perform its international human rights obligations. Other objectives that are 
remotely or tangentially connected with this aim should be avoided. Whenever such 
policies are deemed necessary by a debtor State, adequate social security measures 
to mitigate the adverse impact thereof, especially on vulnerable or marginalized 
groups, must be put in place. 
More importantly, under an international financial cooperation, creditor States 
and the international financial institutions must not take advantage of an economic, 
financial or external debt-related crisis as an opportunity to push for structural 
reforms in debtor states, however useful such reforms might be perceived to be in 
the long term. Such reforms should be initiated, formulated and implemented by the 
debtor States themselves, if they deem appropriate, in pursuance of an independent 
process of national development. It can be said, that international financial 
cooperation must beconsistent with country-designed development strategies. 
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Another crucial aspect of financial cooperation is supposed to be about sharing 
risk of the loan which often caused by the fluctuation of exchange rate. As such, 
lenders should offer the possibility of denominating all or part of the loan in the 
Borrower State’s local currency, or the lenders and borrowers should have an 
advance agreement to avoid exchange rate risks through forward contract 
negotiation (hedging mechanism). Besides, in order to help balance output or trade 
risk, lenders should offer the possibility of indexing loan repayments to rates of 
economic and/or export growth of the debtor’s countries. 
It is understood that international financial cooperation may be related to the 
project financing as it has been illustrated in the case study above. In order to ensure 
the effectiveness of the cooperation in project financing, it is necessary to ensure that 
the international agreement which binding the project financing need to establish 
effective mechanisms to address potential crisis situations in a spirit of solidarity, 
and the project should provide wide access for the benefit of the public. 
Finally, it can be stated that if the central part of achieving the optimal 
international financial cooperation is depent on the willingness of the member states 
involved to consider the domestic interests and the inherent risks of the cooperation. 
Besides, no countries in the international financial cooperation is allowed to 
dominate the other member states if the success of long-run cooperation want to 
achieve optimally. 
 
Policy Recommendation 
1. An international financial cooperation agreement between governments 
thatcannot perfectly observe their domestic circumstances reconciles a trade-off 
between political efficiency of international cooperation and incentives to 
misrepresent domesticcircumstances. Therefore, the domestic circumstances 
should be well understood before undertaking an international financial 
cooperation in order to ensure that the internationalfinancial cooperation 
provide optimum advantages for domestic circumstances. 
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2. An international financial cooperation should emphasize the importance of 
providing the principles for Cross-border Cooperation on Crisis Management. 
Through the seprinciples, relevan tauthorities, including supervisory agencies, 
central banks, and finance ministries, commit to cooperate both in making 
advance preparations for dealing with financial crises and in managing them 
proportionately. 
3. Without financial stability, there is no guarantee that at least one country gains 
from cooperation while no country loses. This may limit the willingness of 
countries to stick to the agreement when a crisis actually happens. Therefore, 
policy-makers need to agree in advance on institutions for crisis management 
and sharing rules for the costs of future interventions in the case of crisis. 
4. The States involved in international financial cooperation are obliged to 
achieve progressively the full realization of economic, social and cultural rights 
requires States to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the 
full realization of these rights. 
5. The availability of guiding principles is of utmost important in international 
financial cooperation. The guiding principles should be designed to assist 
States and all relevant actors including private and public, national and 
international financial institutions, bilateral lenders and organized groups of 
bondholders in the conduct of their respective activities and pursuit of their 
respective interests relating to external debt. 
6. Excessive debt service burdens and harmful conditions linked to loans and 
debt relief often limit investment in and undermine the provision of accessible 
public services. Apart from undermining obligations on economic, social and 
cultural rights, excessive debt burdens pose major obstacles for some countries 
in achieving the Millennium Development Goals. 
7. The International Financial Institution such as World Bank and IMF should be 
able to provide appropriate policies in accordance with the real need and 
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condition of the developing countries being assisted to ensure that 
theproposed program can be implemented. 
8. Itis essentialto underline that Country ownership ofnational development 
strategies is the foundation of developmenteffectiveness. It implies that 
national governments should have the ability to freely choose the strategies 
which they design and implement, and take the lead in both policy formulation 
and implementation. 
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